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Given the importance of capital regulation in the banking industry, how and why a bank's behavior 
reacts to a recapitalization has profound consequences. To this end, we investigate the effects of 306 
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) conducted by listed European banks between 2002 and 2014. We 
use propensity score matching and find that SEOs lead to asset expansion as opposed to any 
deleveraging. Further, we find a decrease in lending in the short-term followed by a subsequent 
increase, a reduction in profitability, and an increase in systemic risk. Regulators might not have fully 
considered this last negative externality when they imposed the tougher Basel III capital requirements. 
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After the recent financial crisis, regulators as well as governments now believe that higher 
capitalization makes banks sounder and more resilient (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2009, 2010). Thus, Basel III imposes higher capital requirements. Corporate finance theory argues 
that a bank has disincentives to raise equity in the stock market (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 
1977; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Kashyap et al., 2008), but bank regulators believe that by having 
higher capital levels, a bank can reduce its insolvency risk (i.e., enhancement of banks’ survival 
probabilities) and can increase its loss absorbance capacity (Berger and Bouwman, 2013; Flannery, 
2014; Berger et al., 2016). However, the empirical literature on the effects of a recapitalization on a 
bank’s behavior is very limited. As a result, the net impact of recapitalizations remains ambiguous. 
Therefore, we investigate the existence of hidden effects associated with banks’ seasoned equity 
offerings (SEOs), defined as a common stock issue at the pricing date of the issue. 
Banks can use SEOs not only to meet higher capital requirements but also to expand assets or 
deleverage, and to change the composition of their asset portfolios. Moreover, SEOs might lead to 
unintended effects on profitability and systemic risk. Because the regulators and supervisors put 
strong pressure on banks to strengthen their capital, an investigation of the hidden effects of SEOs in 
the medium term becomes relevant. The research questions addressed in this paper are as follows: (i) 
Do SEOs lead to asset expansion or do they lead to deleveraging? (ii)  Do SEOs lead to changes in 
lending or in asset composition? (iii) Do SEOs lead to changes in profitability? And (iv) Do SEOs 
lead to changes in systemic risk? 
Research question (i) has its economic motivation in the fact that shareholders pervasively 
resist leverage-reducing recapitalitazions no matter how much such reductions might enhance the 
firm’s value (Admati et al., 2013; Admati et al., 2018). These asymmetric forces behind leverage 
adjustments, which Admati et al. (2018) named the leverage ratchet effect, motivate our decision to 















Relatedly, question (ii) examines how a bank implements its asset expansion. Several 
economic motivations support the lending dominating effect: capital increases banks’ ability to lend 
because of regulatory capital requirements (Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004), safer banks attract more 
deposits that enhances their ability to provide lending (Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004), and 
recapitalizations reduce the magnitude of the banks’ debt overhang problems (Myers, 1977). 
However, the effect on lending is conditional on the magnitude of the recapitalization (Bhattacharya 
and Nyborg, 2013; Philippon and Schnabl, 2013), the banks’ current capital position (Gambacorta and 
Mistrulli, 2004; Inderst and Muller, 2008; Brei et al., 2013), their liquidity position (Kim and Sohn, 
2017), and their profitability level (Cohen and Scatigna, 2016). Therefore, we test whether banks use 
recapitalizations to increase lending when they expand their assets. 
Research question (iii) examines how recapitalizations affect profitability. Several economic 
reasons support a decrease in profitability: bank managers might require a longer time to identify 
suitable borrowers, strategically time their SEOs (Loughran and Ritter, 1997), boost accruals in the 
SEO years (Sloan, 1996; Teoh, Welch and Wong, 1998), or they might decrease leverage; all of which 
can lead to lower risk and hence lower expected profitability (Berger, 1995). Therefore, we investigate 
whether this managerial behavior leads to recapitalizations that decrease profitability. 
Research question (iv) broadens the analysis to the overall banking industry by investigating 
systemic risk. Recapitalizations affect systemic risk in two different ways: a balance-sheet effect and a 
market-return effect. The former effect might reduce systemic risk as long as recapitalizations reduce 
leverage, while the latter might increase systemic risk because of the negative signal that 
recapitalizations can send (Myers and Majluf, 1984). This signal was especially relevant during the 
global financial crisis when it resulted in a loss of confidence in the market (Claessens et al., 2010). 
We therefore contribute to the ongoing capital debate by investigating how and why a bank’s 
behavior reacts to recapitalizations. Specifically, we assess the extent to which the recapitalizations of 
listed European banks led to a growth in assets, deleveraging, changes in asset composition, and 















we estimate the effects of recapitalizations on a number of bank indicators: (i) asset growth (∆(TA)) 
and deleveraging (∆(Lev)), (ii) lending policies (Loans, Loan Reserves, Write-offs), (iii) profitability 
measures (ROA, Profitability of lending), and (iv) systemic riskiness (SRISK, SIFI - systemically 
important financial institution) in the period from one to three years after the SEO. Furthermore, to 
account for different reasons behind SEOs, we investigate the effects of five types: SEOs to 
strengthen capital ratios, to absorb nonperforming loans, to address market underpricing, to follow up 
state interventions, and to take the opportunity to expand assets. 
An important issue that arises when attempting to estimate the effect of a recapitalization on a 
bank’s behavior is that the choice to undertake a SEO is endogenous; that is, a bank determines 
whether it wants to recapitalize and when.1 To address the self-selection issue in this endogenous 
decision, we apply a propensity score matching (PSM) approach. Further, we use instrumental 
variables (IVs) as a robustness test. To our knowledge, prior research has not applied the PSM to 
investigate SEOs, and thus this approach represents the key methodological contribution of our paper. 
Specifically, we estimate the recapitalization effect on the change in the output of banks measured as 
the difference in outcomes before and after SEOs.  
Our results highlight the following effects of bank recapitalizations. First, SEOs lead to asset 
expansion and not to deleveraging, Second, SEOs reduce lending and increase loan reserves and 
write-offs in the year following the recapitalization. The decrease in lending in the first year after a 
recapitalization is however followed by increases in the second and third year. Alternative uses of the 
proceeds from recapitalizations (such as credit risk management via increases in loan reserves and 
write-offs) thus prevail in the short term but not in the medium term. Third, SEOs reduce profitability 
in the three years following the recapitalizations. Fourth, SEOs increase systemic risk and the 
likelihood of achieving SIFI status over the three years following the recapitalizations.  
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 We are also aware that some recapitalizations are forced. However, for European banks the distinction between forced 
and recommended recapitalizations is not unambiguous, and also data on forced recapitalizations are not available. 
Therefore, we conduct our analysis as if all recapitalizations are endogenous. Furthermore, in a separate analysis on the 















The decrease in lending in the year following recapitalizations means that banks do not use the 
full proceeds to provide loans. Alternative uses of the proceeds hence prevail in the short term. One 
alternative use for the proceeds is the increase in loan reserves, which is confirmed by our empirical 
evidence. Banks need to raise capital to be able to put aside higher loan reserves to offset the write-
offs of bad loans. These reserves might explain the decrease in ROA in the first year after the SEO. 
The decrease might be caused by larger write-offs made possible by the higher loan reserves created 
thanks to the proceeds of the recapitalizations.  
The increase in systemic risk and the increase in the likelihood of achieving SIFI status in the 
three years following recapitalizations highlight the presence of hidden effects that are persistent over 
time. The fact that recapitalizations increase the contribution of banks to systemic risk means that 
banks engaging in SEOs become not only the biggest losers in a crisis but also the biggest 
contributors to the crisis. This evidence is reinforced by our finding that SEOs have a positive effect 
on the likelihood of achieving the SIFI status: by raising more capital, banks increase their size and 
hence receive the hidden benefit of reaching a size that guarantees state protection especially during 
the crisis (Laeven et al., 2014). Regulators mitght not have filly accounted for this negative externality 
of recapitalizations when imposing tougher capital requirements.  
Finally, because of the different reasons behind SEOs, we investigate the effects of SEOs in 
several circumstances. First, low capitalized banks need SEOs to strengthen their capital ratios that 
actually positively affects their equity levels, while well-capitalized banks use SEOs for different 
reasons (such as increases in write-offs and loan loss provisions). Second, banks with more 
nonperforming loans use SEOs to write off bad loans and to absorb losses on loans, while banks with 
less nonperforming loans use SEOs to enable bank managers to increase the credit supply that has 
positive effects on the real economy. Third, for banks that are  underpriced in the market (i.e., lower 
price-to-book, PB ratio), SEOs do not improve performance but instead allow a bank to manage its 
credit risk via write-offs and loan reserves. The effects of SEOs on systemic risk differ widely 















risk, whereas the opposite occurs for overpriced banks. Fourth, for banks that go through state 
interventions (state recapitalizations and state guarantees), the subsequent SEOs not only increase 
profitability but also reduce systemic risk and hence support the view on the stabilizing role of public 
ownership. Finally, banks use SEOs to expand their asset portfolio independently of their past growth, 
that is, SEOs lead to asset expansion for both banks with high ex-ante growth and for banks with low 
ex-ante growth. 
Section 2 develops the model that identifies the accounting relations that motivate the analysis 
and lead to our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and the data sources. Section 4 explains the 
methodology. Section 5 discusses the empirical evidence and robustness tests. And, section 6 provides 
a conclusion. 
2. Model specification  
A large and growing literature on banking focuses either on the effects of capital or on its 
determinants.  This literature investigates the effects of the variations in capital (recapitalizations) on 
market performance,  and the effects of the level of regulatory capital on banks’ performance and 
lending.  Nonetheless, banks meet higher capital requirements either by increasing equity 
(recapitalizations) or by reducing assets and lending to risky borrowers in order to reduce risk 
weighted assets (Hyun and Rhee, 2011). Therefore, the studies on the level of capital do not 
necessarily investigate the effects of recapitalizations but might instead capture the effects of the 
changes in the assets and risk. Thus, in this paper we aim to focus on the effects specifically 
attributable to recapitalizations. 
In this section, we develop testable hypotheses for banks’ behavior in relation to asset 















Asset expansion versus deleveraging. Banks might use recapitalizations to generate growth 
in their assets or to reduce leverage. Formally, the proceeds from recapitalizations (      
 )2 that are 
scaled by total assets (    ) are equal to the proportional change in total assets (
       
    
) minus the 
change in debt deflated by total assets (
       
    
): 
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Equation (2) shows the potential consequences that would result from increasing equity. SEOs 
either lead to asset expansion (i.e., SEOs for asset growth) or they lead to deleveraging (i.e., SEOs for 
liability composition). 
In a general theoretical setting, Admati et al. (2018) show that shareholders are always harmed 
by leverage-reducing recapitalizations. They show that shareholders are strictly worse off when 
issuing securities to recapitalize the firm and reduce its outstanding debt. Similarly, in a banking 
model, Admati et al. (2013) show that banks are inclined to asset-expansion recapitalizations. They 
find that shareholders resist any degree of leverage reduction, no matter how inefficient the firm’s 
current level of leverage.  
Collectively, we introduce hypothesis 1 on asset expansion versus deleveraging: 
HA: SEOs are primarily for asset expansion not for deleveraging. 
Asset composition. In terms of simple financial statement mechanics, 
                                      . Therefore: 
       
    
                                      (3) 
where         denotes the ratio of loans to assets at the end of the year,      the ratio of loans to assets at 
the beginning of the year, and        and       denote the ratios of other assets to total assets at the end 
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 Where         
  denotes the value, the         















and at the beginning of the year respectively. That is, we can decompose the bank’s growth of assets 
into changes in their loans and other earnings assets. Thus, when the bank increases its assets 
(
       
    
   , such growth can be driven either by lending expansion (when                or by a 
change in the asset composition (when                          ).  
Recapitalizations should lead to increases in lending (that is the most relevant component of 
total asset, accounting for about 55% in our sample) for a number of reasons. First, capital enhances 
the capacity to increase an insured form of debt (safer banks attract more deposits), and therefore a 
bank’s ability to limit the effects of a drop in lending (Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004). Second, given 
that regulatory capital requirements depend on the amount of loans granted, capital increases a bank’s 
ability to lend (Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004), although under the additional assumption that banks 
face an imperfect market for their equities (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Cornett and Tehranian, 1994; 
Calomiris and Hubbard, 1995; Stein, 1998). The real effect of an increase in capital depends on the 
size of the recapitalizations, the bank’s ex-post ability to meet the capital requirements, and the quality 
of the banks’ clients (Giannetti and Simonov, 2013). Recapitalizations translate into greater loans 
provided that the capital ratio is above a certain threshold (Brei et al., 2013), liquidity is high (Kim 
and Sohn, 2017), and profitability is high (Cohen and Scatigna, 2016). Third, a bank’s recapitalization 
can lead to an increase in lending by reducing the magnitude of the bank’s debt overhang (Myers, 
1977). Nevertheless, in order to be effective, recapitalizations have to be sufficiently large 
(Bhattacharya and Nyborg, 2013; Philippon and Schnabl, 2013), otherwise they are ineffective in 
spurring lending.  
Nonetheless, the impact of recapitalization on lending depends on the bank’s current capital 
position (Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Inderst and Mueller, 2008). If a bank is well-capitalized, a 
reduction in capital does not have to coincide with a reduction in assets. On the contrary, if a bank has 
less capital, then it has to actively manage its assets in order to maintain constant leverage (so-called 















bank, the impact of a recapitalization on lending should be greater than for its well-capitalized 
counterparts. At odds with the idea that leverage invariably leads to excessive risk taking, Inderst and 
Mueller (2008) argue that banks must be sufficiently levered to have first-best incentives to make new 
risky loans. 
Collectively, we introduce hypothesis 2 on asset composition: 
HA: SEOs lead to increases in lending when they are for asset expansion. 
Profitability. Denoting          
      
     
 (where OIi.t equals operating income), it follows that: 
          
        
      
             
       
    
(                    ) 
    
      
  (4) 
with           denoting the return on assets existing at the date t generated at date t+1, 
          denoting the return on incremental assets invested in at date t generated at date t+1, 
                                    , t being the date of the SEO. When SEOs are for asset 
expansion (         ), they hence increase the banks’ ROA in the subsequent year if they lead to 
investment in assets that generate a return in excess of the return on existing assets prior to the SEOs. 
Conversely, SEOs decrease the banks’ ROA in the subsequent year if they lead to an investment in 
assets that generate a return lower than the return on existing assets prior to the SEOs. 
Recapitalizations should lead to decreases in profitability for the following reasons. First, 
banks might need time to identify suitable borrowers, and lending tends to be more profitable than 
investing in securities. Second, banks might time their SEOs and raise capital when performance tends 
to be at its peak (Loughran and Ritter, 1997).  Third, bank managers working on behalf of their 
existing shareholders have incentives to boost accruals in the SEO years (Sloan, 1996; Teoh, Welch 
and Wong, 1998).  Fourth, recapitalizations might decrease leverage that leads to lower risk and hence 
lower expected profitability in both the short and medium term (Berger, 1995).  
Collectively, we introduce hypothesis 3 on profitability: 















 Systemic risk. Our systemic risk variable is SRISK as it combines the shock on the balance-
sheet component and the shock on the market-return component.3 As in Brownlees and Engle (2012, 
2016) and Acharya, Engle and Richardson (2012), SRISK measures the expected capital shortage 
faced by a bank during a system’s distress when the market declines substantially. Formally:  
                         [              ]    (5) 
where k is the minimum fraction of capital that is expressed as the ratio of total assets that each bank 
needs to hold;      and     are the book value of debt and the market value of equity of bank i in 
period t; and              is the long-run marginal expected shortfall of bank i that is conditional on 
a market’s distress (i.e., a decline below threshold          . Denoting                     and 
substituting it in to  equation (5), the equation becomes: 
                                               (6) 
From equation (6), we know that SRISK increases with leverage (      , balance sheet 
component) and with the long-run marginal expected shortfall (             , market-return 
component) and that SRISK decreases with the market value of equity (    ).  
When we introduce SEOs, the balance-sheet and market-return components determine their 
effect on SRISK. As for the balance-sheet component (LEV), given that SEOs reduce leverage ceteris 
paribus and that leverage increases SRISK, thus SEOs reduce systemic risk. This is in line with the 
effect expected by regulators—recapitalizations make banks more resilient (skin in the game effect). 
As for the market-return component (LRMES), given that SEOs increase LRMES ceteris paribus and 
that LRMES increases SRISK, SEOs increase systemic risk. SEOs increase LRMES because of the 
adverse selection problem associated with SEOs. Myers and Majluf (1984) were the first to note that 
SEO announcements might send a negative signal about the bank’s future prospects. Because of the 
informational asymmetry between insiders and investors, there is a negative market reaction and the 
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new equity issues are underpriced. This was especially true during the global financial crisis, when 
recapitalizations of European commercial banks resulted in a loss of confidence in the market 
(Claessens et al., 2010). Therefore, SEOs might have a negative signaling effect and thus increase the 
banks’ expected losses; it follows that SEOs increase systemic risk, which is a hidden effect of 
recapitalizations. Therefore, the net effect of SEOs on SRISK is positive when its effect on LRMES is 
greater than the one on LEV.  
Collectively, we introduce hypothesis 4 on systemic risk: 
HA: SEOs lead to increases in systemic risk when their effect on the market-return component 
is larger than their effect on the balance-sheet component. 
3. Data set and sample 
The cross-country panel data set used in this analysis is obtained by combining five sources: 
Thomson One Banker for information on SEOs, Bankscope (Bureau Van Dijk) for information on the 
consolidated financial statements, Datastream and Bloomberg for market variables, V-Lab for the 
systemic risk measure, and the lists published by the Financial Stability Board and the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision for the SIFI status. The financial statement variables are 
winsorized at the top and bottom 5% of the distribution of each variable. 
We investigate SEOs conducted by European listed banks that occurred between January 2002 
and December 2014. We also distinguish two subperiods (non-crisis: 2002-2006 and 2011-2014; and 
crisis 2007-2010).4  
The SEO, as provided by Thomson One, constitutes our treatment variable. SEO is defined as a 
common stock issue at the pricing date of the issue (that is, an equity issuance involving new common 
stocks, which is dilutive);5 all the offers that meet Thomson Reuters' standard criteria are included. 
                                                 
4
 As robustness tests, we use two other definitions of the crisis.  
5
 We exclude right offers, private placement (Rule 144), and unit offerings. We also exclude pure secondary offers that are 
SEOs based on the exchange of existing shares without any impact on the level of total common equity in the bank. 
















We first use the "New Issue" database to generate the initial sample of fully marketed SEOs over the 
2002 to 2014 period. The initial screen excludes offers below EUR25 million. We include institutions 
where the primary SIC code description is made up by banks and credit institutions. In our final 
sample the number of SEOs is 306 for a total number of 497 bank-year observations.6 Table 1 reports 
the distribution of the 306 SEOs. The control sample consists of banks that have never engaged in any 
SEO operation that consists of 6,155 observations over the sample period. We also use a subsample of 
SEOs after state interventions that we use as a proxy for forced recapitalizations. This subsample 
comprise 33 state recapitalizations and 46 state guarantees interventions. According to the European 
Central Bank, we define public recapitalizations as government purchases of participation capital 
securities such as equities and guarantees (Petrovic and Tutsch, 2009).   
To investigate the effects of recapitalizations, we use several alternative dependent variables 
that we group into four categories: asset growth and deleveraging (∆(TA) and ∆(Lev)), lending policies 
(Loans, Loan Reserves, and Write-offs), profitability measures (ROA and Profitability of lending), and 
systemic riskiness (SRISK and SIFI). The dependent variables’ definitions are given in Table 2 (Panel 
A) and their  summary statistics are reported in Table 3 (Panels A and B). Asset growth  measures the 
asset expansion of the bank.  Deleveraging indicates a reduction in leverage for negative values.  
Loans measures the degree of specialization in the lending activity of the bank. Loan Reserves gives is 
a proxy for the magnitude of precautionary measures taken by a bank for its loan portfolio’s credit 
risk. Write-offs are defined as impairment losses incurred from lending to costumers plus provisions 
for losses expected on loans and advances. ROA measures the efficiency of the business in using its 
assets to generate net income. Profitability of lending measures the proportion of income generated by 
lending with respect to all earning assets. Formally, it represents the average rate of interest the bank 
is charging on its loans. SRISK, measured as in Acharya et al. (2012), is the propensity of a firm to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
on the bank’s capital structure. Therefore, we consider the most common new equity issuance method for capital injections 
from external sources. 
6
 When the dependent variable is systemic risk, the total number of recapitalized banks reduces to 210 because V-Lab 
computes the variable for a subsample of banks. Similarly, when the dependent variable is SIFI, the number of 















be under-capitalized when the financial system as a whole is under-capitalized, that is, in case of a 
new financial crisis. A bank is said to be under-capitalized (or in financial stress) if its equity falls 
below a given fraction k of its assets. The parameter k is defined as a prudential ratio that is typically 
set by the regulator.7 SIFI is defined as a time-varying dummy variable equal to one when the bank is 
included in the lists published by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) of the systemically important global banks. The variable is a dummy 
equal to one in the year in which the SIFI status is acquired and in the following years until the same 
bank is removed from the list, and zero otherwise. Our sample comprises 14 SIFIs per year in 2012, 
2013, and 2014 (13 in 2011). 
We control for several bank, market, and macro variables. The control variables’ definitions are 
given in Table 2 (Panel B) and their summary statistics are reported in Table 3 (Panels C and D). The 
set of control variables is selected to account for the dimensions that the literature considers relevant 
for lending policies, profitability, and systemic riskiness; and the same set is used for all the 
dependent variable specifications. 
First, we control for bank-specific accounting variables (Size, Equity, Liquidity, NIM, and CTI). 
Size, via economies of scale, is extensively considered to affect profitability, typically in a positive 
way (Smirlock, 1985; Goddard et al., 2004). Also, size is expected to positively affect systemic risk 
because large banks can respond to too-big-to-fail subsidies and can suffer from bad corporate 
governance (Black et al., 2013; Laeven et al., 2014). In what concerns the relation between size and 
lending, the literature finds a negative association because larger banks are more devoted to ancillary 
activities than smaller banks due to their ability to amortize the costs of being involved in different 
activities (Berrospide and Edge, 2010).  
                                                 
7
 According to Acharya et al. (2012), SRISK%i,t is the contribution to aggregate SRISK by any bank. To calculate 
systemic risk, the procedure first evaluates the losses that an equity holder would face if there were a crisis (i.e., whenever 
the broad index falls by 40% over the next six months). For crisis scenarios, the expected loss of equity value of firm i is 
called the long-run marginal expected shortfall (LRMES), that is, the average of the fractional returns of the firm’s equity. 
The capital shortfall can be directly computed by recognizing that the book value of debt remains relatively unchanged 















The risk-taking of the banks is tested by their insolvency risk (represented by the amount of 
tangible equity over total assets, Equity); higher values of equity indicate lower insolvency risk as in 
Rochet (1999). Equity’s effect on banks’ profitability is a priori ambiguous. On the one hand, the 
conventional risk-return hypothesis argues for a negative relation (the higher the bank's capitalization 
and its solvency, the safer the bank and the lower the expected return). On the other hand, higher 
capital, and thus lower risk, should increase a bank’s creditworthiness and reduce its funding cost 
(Iannotta et al., 2007; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2014). The effect of equity on systemic risk should be 
positive (Black et al., 2013) because of the risk-taking incentives (as in Perotti et al., 2011); that is, 
more capitalized banks, potentially through regulatory requirements, have incentives to take on tail 
risks that lead to an increased systemic contribution when these risks are realized. Little evidence 
exists on the effect of a bank’s capital ratio on its lending, but such an effect tends to be negative 
(Lown and Morgan, 2006).  
Liquidity represents the percentage of total investments that is promptly converted into cash. As 
for liquidity, some studies find a negative relation with profitability (Molyneux and Thornton, 1992), 
while others either report a positive relation (Bourke, 1989) or no relation (Iannotta et al., 2007). We 
expect a negative relation between systemic risk and liquid assets because the higher the liquid 
resources of a bank the greater the probability of coping with losses in the short term. The effect of 
liquid assets on bank's loans is well documented by Kashyap and Stein (2000), who report a negative 
relation between the presence of short-term assets and loans provided by the bank.  
The efficiency in the management of the bank is tested by the profitability of the banking 
activities (NIM) and the cost-to-income ratio (CTI). NIM represents a measure of the profitability of 
the traditional banking activity. The margins in lending are usually higher than the margins from 
investments in securities, therefore we expect banks with a higher net interest margin to their total 
loans to be more profitable. This is due, for example, to the higher bargaining power of banks in 
providing loans (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). However, the recent empirical evidence finds the 















diversification strategy are more or less profitable is an empirical question that needs to be answered. 
We expect a positive coefficient for the relation between NIM and the specialization in the lending 
activity (Demirguç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999). The empirical evidence on systemic risk instead shows 
a positive relation with market-based activities (and thus a negative relation with NIM) where banks 
contribute more to systemic risk when they engage more in market-based activities and thus are more 
diversified (Laeven et al., 2014). CTI provides a measure of how efficiently a bank is being run: the 
lower it is the better. An extensive banking literature (Bourke, 1989; Molyneux and Thornton, 1992) 
finds a positive relation between better quality management and profitability. As documented by 
Pastor and Serrano (2006), cost inefficiency is positively related with specialization in lending. To the 
best of our knowledge, there is no evidence on the effects of efficiency on systemic risk.  
Second, we control for bank-specific market variables. The first variable is the relative price-to-
book ratio (PB ratio). This measure captures the value of banks’ rents in the banking market (Dinger 
and Vallascas, 2015), thus we expect the PB ratio to be positively correlated with profitability. To the 
best of our knowledge, the relation between the specialization in banking and the PB ratio is not 
deeply investigated; Strahan (1999) proves that lines of credit increase when there is an increase in the 
market-to-book asset ratio. The expected relation between the PB ratio and systemic risk fluctuates 
over time (Black et al., 2013); the relation should be positive when the traditional corporate finance 
risk-return view prevails, while it should be negative if negative market expectations determine a 
reduction in share prices and thus higher systemic risk. Price volatility (Price Vol.) is a market-based 
measure of the risk of the bank. The evidence that refers to the overall market volatility shows a 
positive relation with systemic risk (Laeven et al., 2014). The third variable aims at capturing the life-
cycle effects on the decision to issue equity that is represented (as in Dinger and Vallascas, 2015) by 
the number of years a bank is listed on the stock market (Year listed). Given that younger banks tend 
to rely more on equity issues in order to support their growing investment opportunities (DeAngelo et 
al., 2010) and that we have no unambiguous prediction about the relation between equity and 















on the link between the specialization in banking or systemic risk and the number of years the bank is 
listed on the stock market.  
Third, we control for macroeconomic variables. Specifically, we select the regulatory quality 
(Reg. Quality) of the country where each bank operates (as performed by Demirguç-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 1999, for profitability), and the level of GDP growth (GDP Growth) of each country (as 
performed by Goddard et al., 2011, and Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2014, for profitability).   
4. Methodology  
4.1 The baseline regression analysis 
To estimate the effect of SEOs on the behavior of banks, we use a baseline fixed-effect (FE) 
model.8 To account for the variance not being homogenous in the sample (i.e., presence of within-
subject variability), we run three FE models that represent country, business model, and year as:  
                                            (7) 
where        represents the outcome variables (respectively asset expansion, deleveraging, lending 
policies, profitability, and systemic riskiness for bank i in period t+1), SEO indicates recapitalizations 
and takes a value equal to one if bank i undertakes a recapitalization in period t, and      is the vector 
of covariates grouped into bank-specific variables, market variables, and macroeconomic variables. 
4.2 Propensity score matching 
We use the propensity score matching approach to account for whether the SEO is an 
endogenous decision (not random) and to correct for self-selection.  We then investigate how and to 
what extent the treatment (being recapitalized) changes the average outcome variable (asset expansion 
vs. deleveraging, lending policies, profitability, and systemic riskiness) for the banks that are actually 
treated. We need to know what would have happened to the behavior of recapitalized banks had they 
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not recapitalized. The effect of recapitalization on the outcome of bank i, known in the evaluation 
literature as the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), can be expressed as: 
      {       
           }     {       
           }    (8) 
where        is a variable that indicates the recapitalization and that takes a value equal to one if bank 
i conducts a recapitalization in period t. The        
  is the outcome change in bank i at time t+   after 
being recapitalized in period t (where   goes from one to three years after the event), and the        
  is 
the hypothetical outcome change in the same bank i at the same time t+  if it does not recapitalize in 
period t (where,        
  =       
            
 ).9 
The propensity score matching is a two-stage semi-parametric procedure where in the first 
stage we estimate the probability of being treated (using a probit regression) on the basis of pre-
treatment observables X; in the second stage, we match treated and untreated with the same p(X), we 
calculate the differences in the outcomes, and we average them.  
In the first stage, as for the implementation of the matching, the treatment participation is not a 
random assignment (banks decide whether and when to recapitalize) but depends stochastically on a 
vector of observable variables. In such a situation, propensity score matching is useful to reduce the 
dimensionality of the X vector. Denoting p(X) as the propensity score, the conditional probability of 
receiving the treatment given the pre-treatment variables is:  
                         (9) 
The basic reasoning behind the propensity score is the following: if for any treated 
observation, we can find a non-treated one that is as similar as possible in terms of observable 
characteristics, then the difference in the outcome between the treated and the matched control should 
be due to the treatment itself. That is, once these variables account for (X), the assignment to 
treatment is random. 
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In the second stage, we identify the untreated sample by the kernel matching procedure. Let 
Wji denote the weight given to the j-th untreated case in making the comparison with the i-th treated 
case (where 0< Wji <1), then: 
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   }       (10) 
 4.3 Reasons for SEOs 
To account for different reasons behind SEOs, we specifically investigate the case where 
banks use SEOs to strengthen their capital ratios (i.e. capital pressures). For this purpose, we 
investigate the effects of SEOs by distinguishing low capitalized banks from well-capitalized banks, 
where low capitalized banks have a common equity capital ratio lower than the regulatory threshold 
(equal to 3.5% according to Basel III in 2013). This threshold corresponds to 15% of the banks in our 
sample. These low capitalized banks are the ones that need to raise equity to become compliant with 
the new regulation, thus they can be considered somewhat as forced recapitalizations.  
To further investigate the different reasons behind SEOs, we also analyze the case where 
banks use SEOs to absorb nonperforming loans. In Europe, and especially for the Italian banking 
system, the authorities and bankers (Garrido et al., 2016) well recognize the need to stabilize and 
lessen the nonperforming loans (NPLs) through equity capital. In this regard, we analyze the effects 
on the same set of outcome variables by distinguishing between banks with a low share of 
nonperforming loans over gross loans (Low NPLs) and banks with a high share (High NPLs). The 
thresholds  are the 25th and the 75th percentile, respectively. 
To analyze how underpricing versus overpricing of bank equity affects SEOs, we identify 
banks based on the magnitude of their PB ratios. Lakonishok et al. (1994) argue that banks trading on 
high price multiples are overvalued (glamour stocks) and banks trading on low price multiples are 
undervalued (value stocks). If low PB ratio stocks are indeed undervalued, managers of these banks 















define value stocks as those with a ratio lower than the 20th percentile and glamour stocks as those 
with a ratio greater than the 80th percentile. 
Furthermore, we focus on those banks that go through state interventions (state 
recapitalizations and state guarantees)  and then investigate the effects of the subsequent SEOs. This 
enables us to find out how results change in presence of prior forced recapitalizations, that typically 
occur for more fragile banks (Laeven and Valencia, 2012), and to question the view on the stabilizing 
role of public ownership (Bertay et al., 2015).  
Finally, to account for the opportunity to expand assets, we investigate the effects of SEOs by 
distinguishing banks with low ex-ante asset expansion from banks with high ex-ante asset expansion. 
The thresholds for each are the 40th and the 60th percentile of total asset growth in the year prior to 
the recapitalization respectively. Given that hypothesis 1 states that SEOs lead primarily to asset 
expansion, both high- and low-asset expansion banks should use the proceeds from SEOs to pursue 
the opportunity to expand their asset portfolio.  
5. Empirical results 
We perform a preliminary investigation of the differences between recapitalized and non-
recapitalized banks during normal and crisis periods for both the dependent variables and control 
variables (Table 3).  
The dependent variables (Table 3, Panel A) both before and after the event show that SEO 
banks grow more than their non-SEO counterparts (∆(TA)); while there are no significant differences 
in the growth rate of leverage (∆(Lev)). Before the SEO, recapitalized banks have lower profitability 
(ROA and Profitability of lending) and loan reserves than their non-recapitalized peers, whereas they 
are more involved in lending and contribute more to systemic risk (SRISK). After the SEO, 
recapitalized banks continue to have lower profitability and continue to be more involved in lending 















for banks that are going to recapitalize, and this difference is statistically significant both before and 
after the SEO event.  
When we focus on recapitalized banks only, Panel B of Table 3 shows that after SEOs, 
recapitalized banks reduce their lending as compared to the year prior to the recapitalization during 
the non-crisis period, while no statistically significant differences occur during the crisis. Before 
SEOs, recapitalized banks put aside lower reserves to offset loan losses during the crisis period as 
compared to the non-crisis period. After SEOs, recapitalized banks increase loan reserves and 
decrease profitability, especially during the crisis. Further, banks are less interconnected during the 
non-crisis period, whereas the opposite occurs during the crisis (i.e., banks have a larger likelihood of 
becoming a SIFI).  
As for control variables (Panel C), recapitalized banks are larger, less capitalized, less cost 
efficient, less liquid and have lower margins, higher price volatility, longer period listed, and operate 
in countries with lower growth and lower regulatory quality. During the crisis as opposed to a non-
crisis period (Panel D), recapitalized banks are larger, less capitalized, less liquid, more cost efficient, 
trade on higher price-to-book ratios, have higher price volatility, and operate in countries with lower 
growth and higher regulatory quality. 
5.1 The effects of SEOs – Baseline FE regressions 
 We report the findings from our baseline FE regressions in Panels A-C of Table 4.10 First, one 
year after the recapitalization, banks conduct SEOs mainly for asset expansion rather than for 
deleveraging. This evidence confirms hypothesis 1. Second, we find that SEOs reduce lending as well 
as increase credit risk management either through loan reserves or write-offs on loans. This evidence 
does not confirm hypothesis 2 in that one year after the recapitalizations, SEOs do not lead to 
increases in lending but their proceeds are used to mitigate credit risk. The effect on credit risk 
management is crucial to fully understand the effects on the lending policies. Third, SEOs reduce 
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profitability (ROA, and Profitability of lending) that is consistent with hypothesis 3. Further, SEOs 
increase systemic risk (SRISK) as well as the likelihood of becoming a SIFI in the year following the 
recapitalization, which is consistent with hypothesis 4.
11
  
As for control variables, in the Country FE specification, size positively affects Asset growth, 
ROA (as shown in prior studies such as Smirlock, 1985; Goddard et al., 2004; Berrospide and Edge, 
2010), systemic risk (in line with prior literature such as Black et al., 2013; Laeven et al., 2014), and 
the probability of becoming a SIFI; whereas it negatively affects lending, loan reserves, and write-offs 
on loans. Equity positively affects ROA and loan reserves, while higher capitalization leads to a 
reduction in asset expansion, lending, and systemic risk. Liquidity leads to asset expansion and 
increases write-offs on loans and systemic risk. It decreases loans over total assets and the profitability 
of lending. The net interest margin increases profitability (ROA and Profitability of lending). This 
finding indicates that the banks that are better able to extract margins from traditional banking show 
better profitability probably due to their bargaining power (as suggested by Holmstrom and Tirole, 
1997). Moreover, the net interest margin increases loans over total assets (accordingly to the evidence 
in Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999) and leads to asset expansion, while the higher net interest 
margin reduces systemic riskiness. Operating inefficiency (CTI) increases leverage and loan loss 
reserves and decreases lending, write-offs on loans, ROA, and systemic risk. Price-to-book increases 
profitability (ROA and Profitability of lending) and accordingly decreases write-offs. Price volatility 
increases credit risk management (through loan reserves and write-offs), systemic risk (as documented 
in Laeven et al., 2014), and the probability of becoming a SIFI; whereas liquidity decreases ROA, 
lending, and leverage. Year listed leads to asset expansion, increases the return on assets, the 
profitability of lending, and systemic risk; while it decreases loans and loan reserves. Growth at the 
country level leads to asset expansion and increases in the profitability of lending, loans, and write-
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 This evidence is validated across the three FE regression specifications for asset growth, deleveraging, lending, loan 
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consider Year FE, while for the SIFI status the results are validated for all three specifications except when we consider 
Country FE. The effect on write-offs is confirmed only in the Specialization on lending FE specification, whereas the 















offs and decreases loan reserves and the probability of becoming a SIFI. Regulatory quality adversely 
affects profitability, loans, and loan reserves. Crisis negatively affects ROA and asset expansion, 
whereas it positively affects write-offs, leverage, and lending. The findings on control variables 
remain qualitatively confirmed for the Year FE and Specialization on lending FE specifications. 
5.2 The effects of SEOs - Propensity score matching  
Provided that SEOs are discretionary, we investigate their effects on a set of dependent 
variables by using propensity score matching to detect selection in the observables (Table 5). 
Specifically, we look at the effects one year after the SEO and also in a longer time interval (two and 
three years after the SEO). When considering the probit regression results (Table 5, Panel A), the 
probability of going through an SEO increases with the bank’s size, operating efficiency, price 
volatility and decreases with the bank’s equity and year listed. The conditional independence 
assumption and the common support condition are satisfied. 
Asset expansion or deleveraging. Because recapitalizations might be used to generate growth 
in a bank’s assets or to reduce leverage, we use propensity score matching to investigate how a bank’s 
behavior reacts to recapitalizations (Table 5, Panel B).  Panel B shows that recapitalized banks 
experience a larger (and increasing) expansion in assets in the three years following the SEO than 
their non-issuing peers. At the same time, recapitalized banks do not show any change in their level of 
leverage in the three years following the SEO compared to their non-issuing peers. In essence, SEOs 
are associated with asset expansion and not with deleveraging, which indicates that commercial banks 
pursue a leverage targeting strategy (as shown by Adrian and Shin, 2010 for the US, and by Baglioni 
et al., 2013 for the EU). 
Asset composition. Given that asset expansion can be decomposed into changes in bank loans 
and changes in other assets, we use propensity score matching to investigate how a bank’s lending 
policies are related to recapitalizations (Table 5, Panel B). Panel B shows that recapitalized banks 
decrease their lending more than their peers in the year following the SEO. But they increase their 















validated for years two and three after the recapitalization: once their credit risk is mitigated, banks 
use the proceeds from SEOs to expand loans.  
Furthermore, recapitalized banks increase their loan reserves more than their peers in the first 
year following their recapitalization and report higher increases in loan write-offs in each of the three 
years afterwards. The decrease in lending in the short run means that banks do not use the full 
proceeds from recapitalizations to provide loans (presumably due to the time needed to process loan 
requests), as documented in prior studies (Francis and Osborne, 2009; Albertazzi and Marchetti, 2010; 
Martynova, 2015).12 Alternative uses of the proceeds hence prevail in the short term. One alternative 
use for the proceeds is an increase in loan reserves, which is confirmed by our empirical evidence: 
banks need to raise capital to be able to put aside higher loan reserves to be used to offset the write off 
of bad loans. This finding is consistent with Cummings and Durrani (2016) who find that Australian 
banks allocate part of their surplus capital above regulatory requirements to pre-fund future credit 
losses through provisions. 
The SEOs increase, rather than decrease as in the first year, lending in the subsequent two 
years. This increase indicates a positive effect of recapitalizations on lending in the medium term; that 
is, referring to our analytical model, the lending expansion dominates the changes in asset 
composition (equation 3), as documented in the prior literature (Myers, 1977; Gambacorta and 
Mistrulli, 2004; Giannetti and Simonov, 2013). Recapitalizations induce bank managers to increase 
the credit supply, although not in the short term as it might take time to identify worthy borrowers. 
Profitability. When using propensity score matching (Table 5, Panel B), recapitalized banks 
experience a larger decline in profitability (ROA and Profitability of lending) in the three years 
following the SEO than their non-issuing peers. The gap in profitability between issuing and non-
issuing banks is stronger when considering changes in profitability over longer time intervals (two to 
three years following the recapitalization compared with the year prior to the event). Such a decrease 
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in ROA confirms the expectation from our analytical model (equation 4) and is consistent with the 
economic reasoning provided in prior studies (Myers, 1977; Berger, 1995; Sloan, 1996; Loughran and 
Ritter, 1997; Teoh, Welch and Wong, 1998). 
Furthermore, if we combine the results from profitability and the specialization in lending, 
then the steeper reduction in ROA might be due to at least two components: the increase in write-offs 
and the reduction in the interest spread on the lending. The reasons might be the reduction in loans 
granted one year after the SEO and a lower interest spread on lending (in the second and third year 
after the SEO). 
Systemic risk. SEOs increase the systemic risk more than the non-issuing banks in each of the 
three years following the recapitalization. This finding means that recapitalizations increase the 
interconnectedness of banks. One possible explanation is the signaling effect of SEOs: during the 
crisis, recapitalizations of European commercial banks resulted in a loss of confidence in the market 
(Claessens et al., 2010). Thus, SEOs had a negative signaling effect and increased systemic risk.  This 
effect means that SEOs increased the banks’ expected losses when the market was in financial distress 
(LRMES). The results on SRISK show a hidden effect of recapitalizations. 
Another possible explanation is related to the acquisition of the SIFI status via 
recapitalizations. In the years following the recapitalization, SEOs increase the likelihood of 
becoming a SIFI and such increase becomes stronger over time. By raising more capital, banks 
increase their size and hence gain the hidden benefit of reaching a size that guarantees state protection, 
especially during a crisis (Laeven et al., 2014). Hence a recapitalization introduces moral hazard to the 
bank, as supported by the increase in write-offs. This negative externality of recapitalizations might 
presumably not be fully taken into account by regulators when imposing tougher capital requirements.  
5.3 Reasons for SEOs 
To take into account that different reasons motivate SEOs, and hence they might have different 















attributes (capital pressures, credit risk severity, underpricing, state interventions, and asset expansion 
opportunity). 
We first investigate the case where banks use SEOs to strengthen their capital ratios. When we 
distinguish between low capitalized banks and well-capitalized banks, our results show that the effects 
of recapitalizations are very different for the two subsamples (Table 6, Panel A). For well-capitalized 
banks, we confirm all the effects for the overall sample. For low capitalized banks, instead, SEOs 
affect neither profitability (ROA and Profitability of lending) nor the lending policies (Loans, Loan 
Reserves, and Write-offs) in the year following the SEO compared to their non-issuing peers. SEOs of 
low capitalized banks positively and strongly affect systemic risk. Next, we test the effect of SEOs on 
the equity level to better understand the effect of capital strength during the transition to Basel III. For 
low capitalized banks, banks use SEOs to strengthen their capital ratios and actually positively affect 
equity levels, while for well-capitalized banks, SEOs negatively affect equity levels as they are used 
for different reasons (as confirmed by the increase in write-offs and loan loss provisions). 
To analyze the severity of credit risk as a reason for SEOs, we investigate the effect on 
different levels of NPLs (Table 6, Panel B). The results show that banks with a low share of NPLs 
allocate more resources from SEOs to Loans in the first year following the SEO than their non-issuing 
peers. This allocation means that recapitalizations induce bank managers to increase the credit supply 
in the real economy when they have less trouble with NPLs. Moreover, these banks reduce their 
exposure to systemic risk (SRISK) after the SEOs. The effects are markedly different for banks with a 
high share of NPLs over gross loans. They use resources from SEOs with the aim to write off bad 
loans and to absorb losses on loans as shown by the increase in loan reserves and write-offs. For this 
subsample of banks the exposure to systemic risk (SRISK) is higher following SEOs: this exposure 
means that SEOs increase systemic risk when credit risk at the bank level is especially high. For the 
profitability from the operating activity (ROA), the evidence shows that banks with low 















loans experience a reduction in these profitability measures because of the reduction in the 
profitability of their lending.  
Moreover to investigate the reasons for SEOs associated to market valuations, we look at the 
effects of SEOs at different levels of PB ratios as a proxy for underpricing or overpricing of the 
bank’s equity (Table 6, Panel C). The results show that for banks trading on lower PB ratios, SEOs 
reduce profitability (ROA and Profitability of lending); while for banks with higher PB ratios, SEOs 
have no effect on profitability. For banks trading on low as opposed to high PB ratios, SEOs lead to 
increases as opposed to decreases in loan write-offs. If a bank’s PB ratio represents underpricing or 
overpricing of equity, then equityholders in low PB banks should be very reluctant to see their bank 
doing a SEO. Our analysis shows that SEOs do not improve performance but instead allow a bank to 
manage its credit risk via write-offs. The effects of SEOs on systemic risk differ widely between 
lower and higher PB banks: for underpriced banks SEOs determine an increase in systemic risk, 
whereas the opposite occurs for overpriced banks. This difference could be explained by the fact that 
recapitalization might signal that the banking system is riskier than previously expected and therefore 
other banks might go through a recapitalization too (i.e. fear that other banks may be forced to go 
through SEOs too). 
Furthermore, we focus on those banks that go through state interventions and then investigate 
the effects of the subsequent SEOs (Table 6, Panel D). We observe that subsequent SEOs increase 
profitability (ROA and Profitability of lending) as well as loan loss reserves and write-offs. Moreover, 
SEOs decrease systemic risk, whereas they have no effect on loans. These findings show that SEOs 
preceded by state interventions not only increase profitability but also reduce systemic risk, which is 
different from what is observed for the overall sample and hence support the view on the stabilizing 
role of public ownership.13 
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that go through a state intervention, whereas there is no effect for other banks. Furthermore, SEOs increase the loan loss 
















Finally, we look at the effects of SEOs for banks with high- and low-asset expansion in the 
year prior to the recapitalization (Table 6, Panel E). The results show that banks use SEOs as an 
opportunity to expand their asset portfolios independently of past growth, that is, SEOs lead to asset 
expansion for both banks with high ex-ante growth and for banks with low ex-ante growth. Still asset 
expansion after SEOs is stronger for those banks experiencing higher growth over the previous year, 
and such asset expansion translates into an expansion in loans in the year following SEOs (differently 
from the baseline evidence). For those banks experiencing lower growth over the previous year, we 
continue to observe a reduction in loans in the year following SEOs (as in the baseline evidence), and 
alternative uses of the proceeds (i.e. credit risk management via increase in loan reserves and in write-
offs) continue to prevail in the short term (again in line with the baseline evidence).  
5.4 Additional analyses and robustness tests 
Instrumental variables analysis 
In this subsection, we validate our results with an instrumental variable approach.14  
The variables we use to instrument the recapitalization decision are the proportion of shares 
held by institutional investors and the value traded in the domestic market. Institutional investors is 
defined as the proportion of shares held by institutional investors. We calculate this variable as the 
logarithm of the proportion of capital that a bank has that is "not free-floating", if any. The higher the 
proportion of shares held by institutional investors, the lower the likelihood of recapitalization should 
be. The rational is threefold. First, the monitoring by institutional investors, who are active outside 
informed investors that possess private information about firms making SEOs (Chemmanur et al., 
2009), facilitates valuable internal control efforts (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Denis and Serrano, 
1996; Elyasiani and Jia, 2010; Attig et al., 2012). Second, institutional investors aim to avoid a dilution 
of their shares and therefore discourage recapitalizations. Under the debt overhang condition (Myers, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
status much more for state recapitalized banks than for others, which again supports the view on the stabilizing role of 
state interventions. 
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1977), the existing shareholders might not benefit from new capital injections because most of the 
benefits might go to existing creditors. Third, given the well-established evidence on reductions in the 
share price after SEOs (Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Masulis and Korwar, 1986; Krishnan et al., 2010; 
Elyasiani et al., 2014; Kim and Purnanandam, 2014; Silva and Bilinski, 2015), investors view equity 
issues as negative signals (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Myers and Majluf, 1984); this is especially true for 
institutional investors because of their large shareholdings (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). 
As a second instrument, we use Value traded that is defined as the value of the trades of shares 
on domestic market relative to GDP in country j, as justified by Levine and Zervos (1998) and as 
theoretically motivated by Levine (1991) and Bencivenga et al. (1995). Value traded measures trading 
volumes as a share of national output and should therefore positively reflect liquidity on an economy-
wide basis. Given that Levine and Zervos (1998) find that the stock market’s liquidity positively 
predicts capital accumulation, a more liquid market should be associated with a higher number of 
recapitalizations.  
These instruments predict cross-bank variation in the decision to undertake a recapitalization 
but they are independent from the outcome variables under study.15 Moreover, the hypothesis that the 
proportion of institutional investors adversely affects the likelihood of recapitalization and that the 
value traded positively affects SEOs are confirmed by the results from the first-stage regression 
(Table 7, Panels A-J, column 1).16 Thus, our instruments have explanatory power for the endogenous 
regressor (SEO) after conditioning on all of the other remaining exogenous variables (confirming the 
relevant condition).  
The IV regression analysis confirms the results from propensity score matching (Table 7, 
columns 2, 3, and 4). In the year following the recapitalization, as shown in the second stage, SEOs 
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 The validity condition (that is the instrument should be uncorrelated with the error term) cannot be tested because u is 
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not statistically significant for all outcome variables except for profitability and systemic risk variables. 
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 In the first stage, we observe that as expected, institutional investors show a negative coefficient for all the specifications 
and the magnitude of the coefficient is about -6-7%. And as expected, the value traded shows a positive coefficient and the 
















lead primarily to asset expansion, although a very minor deleveraging is observed. SEOs continue to 
reduce profitability (ROA and Profitability of lending) and lending and increase loan reserves, write-
offs, systemic risk, and the likelihood of becoming a SIFI. In the second and third year following the 
recapitalizations, SEOs continue to lead primarily to asset expansion, although a very minor 
leveraging is observed (taken together first and second year though confirm leverage targeting). SEOs 
continue to reduce profitability (ROA and Profitability of lending) and increase lending as well as loan 
reserves and  write-offs. SEOs also continue to increase systemic risk and the likelihood of becoming 
a SIFI.  
Further, the absolute values of the SEO coefficient and the F-test are much higher in the IV 
regression than in the fixed-effect regressions. These values indicate that SEOs might indeed be 
mostly discretionary, which validates our use of the IV regression as a robustness test and our choice 
of instrumental variables.  
Systemic risk definition 
An alternative measure of systemic risk is ∆CoVaR that is defined according to Adrian and 
Brunnermeier (2016) as the difference between the financial system’s VaR conditional on a bank 
being in distress and the financial system’s VaR conditional on ongoing base business for the bank.17 
It captures the marginal contribution of a bank to overall systemic risk, but differently from SRISK it 
does not disentangle the effect of the shock on the balance-sheet component (LEV) from the effect of 
the market-return component. If a bank is under distress and recapitalizations result in a loss of 
confidence in the market (as argued by Claessens et al., 2010), then recapitalizations increase 
∆CoVaR (i.e., SEOs lead to a shift to the left of the bank’s return distribution). 
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        is estimated weekly using quantile regressions from January 2002 to December 2014. To allow for a time-
varying       , we also control for a set of global state variables at the European level. Following Adrian and 
Brunnermeir (2016), we include the change in the three-month government yield at the EU level, the change in the slope 
of the yield curve, that is, the liquidity spread between the long-term government bond rate and the three-month rate, the 
EU short-term TED spread (defined as the difference between the three-month interbank Euribor rate and the three-month 
yield rate on a government bond), the change in the credit spread between the return of the investment grade and 
government bond yield, the weekly changes in the EU market return (computed from the FTSE EuroTop 100), the weekly 
real estate sector return in excess of the market financial sector return and the European equity volatility (represented by 















All the results obtained with SRISK are confirmed when we consider ∆CoVaR as a definition 
for systemic risk. When considering a systemic risk measure that accounts for only the market-return 
component (∆CoVaR), the findings confirm that SEOs increase the banks’ contribution  to systemic 
risk; this increase means that when banks conduct SEOs, they become not only the biggest losers in a 
crisis but also become the biggest contributors to the crisis. The results on ∆CoVaR confirm a hidden 
effect of recapitalizations (as reported in Table 5 for PSM and Table 7 for IV). 
Crisis definition 
As a final robustness test, we replicate our main analysis by using two alternative definitions of 
the crisis: the global financial crisis of 2007–09 only and both the global financial crisis of 2007–09 
and the European sovereign debt crisis of 2010–11. The start of the global financial crisis is identified  
as August 2007, which is according to the Bank for International Settlements (2010). All the results 
from the baseline sample are confirmed when we consider as definition of crisis the period 2007-2009 
with few exceptions.18  
 6. Conclusions 
After the recent financial crisis, regulators as well as governments claim that higher 
capitalization makes banks sounder and more resilient, and accordingly Basel III has imposed tougher 
capital requirements. Corporate finance theory argues that a bank has disincentives to raise equity in 
the stock market but bank regulators believe that, by having higher capital levels, a bank might be able 
to reduce its insolvency risk and to increase its loss absorbance capacity. The empirical literature on 
the effects of recapitalizations on banks’ behavior is however very limited. This paper hence 
                                                 
18
 The effects on ROA become positive three years after the recapitalization, whilst they become positive on profitability 
of lending in the second and third year after the recapitalization. When the outcome variable is write-off the coefficient is 
positive and significant only three years after the recapitalization. The effects of SEO on loans, loan reserves, systemic risk 
and SIFI are the same with both definitions of crisis. Results from the baseline sample are also confirmed when we include 
the European sovereign debt crisis (2007-2011) in the crisis definition, although some exceptions remain: the effect on 
ROA turns out positive two years after the recapitalization, whilst the effect on profitability of lending is not statistically 
significant three years after the event. The increase in loan reserves and write-offs is confirmed, except in the second year 
after the event and the effect on loans is confirmed two years following the SEO. The effects of SEO on systemic risk and 















contributes to the ongoing capital debate by investigating the effects of SEOs on asset expansion 
versus deleveraging, lending policies, credit risk management decisions, profitability, and the degree 
of interconnectedness with the banking system for European banks between January 2002 and 
December 2014.  
Concerning the how a bank’s behavior reacts to a recapitalization, our results show that SEOs  
lead to assets expansion, and not to any deleveraging. Moreover, SEOs reduce profitability and 
lending and increase loan reserves and systemic risk in the year following the recapitalization. 
Decreases in profitability and increases in write-offs and systemic risk persist over the three years 
following the recapitalization events. Recapitalizations are thus used to manage credit risk, especially 
during the financial crisis. In addition, the decrease in lending in the first year after a recapitalization 
is followed by increases in the second and third years. These increases show that recapitalizations are 
also used to finance the real economy although not in the very short term.   
Concerning the why a bank’s behavior reacts to a recapitalization, we consider five possible 
cases (i.e.: banks under capital pressure, the severity of its credit risk, underpricing, state 
interventions, and asset expansion). The results show that when banks have low capital, they 
essentially use SEOs to strengthen capital ratios. Also, when banks have high nonperforming loans, 
SEOs are used pervasively to deal with credit risk; while when nonperforming loans are low, SEOs 
enable bank managers to increase the credit supply with positive effects on the real economy. 
Underpricing impacts the effects of SEOs on systemic risk; specifically for underpriced banks SEOs 
lead to an increase in systemic risk, whereas the opposite occurs for overpriced banks. Furthermore, 
for banks that go through state interventions, the subsequent SEOs not only increase profitability but 
also reduce systemic risk, which is different from what is observed for the overall sample. Hence, this 
finding supports the view that public ownership has a stabilizing role. Further, banks use SEOs as an 
opportunity to expand their asset portfolio independent of their history of past asset growth, which 















However, the fact that recapitalizations increase the contribution of banks to systemic risk 
(both in the short and medium term) means that banks that engage in SEOs become not only the 
biggest losers in a crisis but also the biggest contributors to the crisis. This evidence is reinforced by 
our finding that SEOs have a positive effect on the likelihood of becoming a SIFI. By raising more 
capital, banks increase their size and hence can get the hidden benefit of reaching a size that 
guarantees state protection during a crisis. This negative externality of recapitalizations presumably 
might not have been fully taken into account by regulators when imposing tougher capital 
requirements. The existence of this  externality brings into question the steps recently taken by the 
Basel III Committee towards tougher requirements that pay little attention to the interplay between 
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Table 1: Recapitalizations by country and year and control sample 
Panel A: number of observations 
Year 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
  
              
Control Sample 485 479 483 476 484 481 464 455 469 466 472 473 468 6155 
SEO banks 12 18 14 21 13 16 33 42 28 31 25 24 29 306 
  
              
Total 497 497 497 497 497 497 497 497 497 497 497 497 497 6461 
  
Panel B: Countries 
SEO by country and year 
 Non-crisis Crisis Non-crisis  
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
  
              
Austria 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 4 
Belgium 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Cyprus 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 5 
Denmark 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 2 6 0 0 19 
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 4 
France 0 1 0 1 1 1 3 1 0 1 1 2 2 14 
Germany 0 3 1 4 0 0 3 3 2 2 1 2 1 22 
Greece 0 3 1 2 1 2 0 4 1 3 0 2 2 21 
Hungary 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Ireland 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Italy 3 2 3 4 3 2 7 4 4 7 2 2 7 50 
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Netherland 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Poland 0 1 0 2 3 0 0 6 3 1 2 5 3 26 
Portugal 5 2 2 1 1 2 5 3 2 1 3 1 3 31 
Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 4 
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 
Spain 1 1 3 4 1 3 4 5 4 8 5 4 3 46 
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 2 1 7 
Uk 3 1 3 2 1 2 7 6 3 0 2 3 5 38 
Total 12 18 14 21 13 16 33 42 28 31 25 24 29 306 
















Table 2: Variable definitions 
This table presents the areas of interest, names, and definitions  of the dependent (Panel A) and control variables (Panel B).  
 
Areas of interest Variable Variable name Variable proxy 
Panel A: Dependent Variables 
Asset expansion Asset growth ∆ (TA) Ln(Total Assetst+1 )- Ln(Total Assetst) 
Liabilities 
composition 
Deleveraging ∆ (Lev) Levt+1- Levt 
where Lev=Debt/Total Assets 
Lending policies Percentage of total assets invested in loans Loans Loans/ Total Assets 
 Precautionary reserves against credit losses Loan Reserves Loans Loss Reserves / Total Loans 
 Non-collectable credit Write-offs Write-offs/Total Loans 
Profitability  Operating profitability ROA Operating income/Total Assets 
 Profitability of lending Prof. Lending Net Interest Income on Loans/Avg Earning Assets 
Systemic 
riskiness 
Degree of interconnectedness with the other 
banks (Brownlees and Engle, 2016) 
SRISK Bank i’s sensitivity to market-return and balance sheet 
components 
Degree of interconnectedness with the other 
banks (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016) 
∆CoVaR Bank i’s contribution to systemic risk  
 
Dummy variable identifying systemically 
important financial institutions as defined by 
the Financial Stability Board 
SIFI Time-varying dummy. European banks among 
Systemically Important Global Banks (G-SIBs). 
Panel B: Control Variables 
Bank-specific 
variables  
Size  Size Ln(Total Assets) 
Capital strength Equity Total Equity / Total Assets 
Liquidity risk Liquidity Liquid assets / Total Assets 
Net interest margin NIM [Interest Income - Interest Expense]/Loans 
Cost-to-income CTI Operating costs / Intermediation margin 
Market variables Price-to-book ratio PB Ratio Market value / Book Value of Equity 
Price volatility Price Vol. Standard deviation of the share price during the year 
Year listed Year listed Number of years the bank is listed on the exchange. 
Macro-variables GDP growth GDP Growth Growth in the GDP of the country where the bank is 
listed 
Regulatory quality Reg. Quality Ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote 















Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
The table presents the statistics for the dependent and control variables. Panel A presents the comparison between SEO banks and the 
control sample. Panel B shows the comparison between the crisis and non-crisis periods for recapitalized banks only. Panel C shows 
the comparison between SEO banks and the control sample. Panel D shows the comparison between the crisis and non-crisis periods 
independently of the SEO status.The Mean, Observations, St. Dev., Minimum and Maximum stand for the cross-sectional mean, 
standard deviation values of the sample of banks one year before the SEO and one year after it. The columns and rows "Diff" report 
the comparison analysis of bank-specific characteristics (dependent variables and control variables) between SEO and non-SEO 
banks and between crisis and non-crisis periods respectively. Differences in mean are calculated as the difference between bank-




Panel A: SEO versus control banks 
 SEO=0 SEO=1 Diff. 
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max  
∆ (TA) Before 3468 0.051 0.491 -6.698 3.612 238 0.328 0.580 -3.384 2.168 0.277*** 
∆ (TA) After 3525 0.053 0.495 -6.698 3.612 209 0.305 0.581 -3.484 1.927 0.252*** 
∆ (Lev) Before 3515 0.002 0.235 -2.007 13.259 239 0.004 0.057 -0.502 0.635 0.002 
∆ (Lev) After 3573 0.002 0.233 -2.007 13.259 209 -0.002 0.021 -0.146 0.183 -0.004 
Loans Before 3408 0.541 0.238 0.034 0.849 260 0.585 0.182 0.034 0.849 0.044*** 
Loans After 3332 0.544 0.238 0.033 0.850 217 0.578 0.177 0.033 0.850 0.034*** 
Loan Reserves Before 2664 4.724 6.230 0.000 77.626 244 4.122 3.316 0.260 19.353 -0.601** 
Loan Reserves After 2620 4.608 6.032 0.000 77.626 205 4.802 5.623 0.219 43.750 0.194 
Write-offs Before  3129 0.018 0.394 -11.890 8.177 255 0.013 0.014 -0.004 0.117 -0.005 
Write-offs After 3062 0.015 0.415 -12.020 8.162 214 0.016 0.027 -0.012 0.213 0.001*** 
ROA Before 3999 1.526 3.561 -4.568 12.002 263 0.205 1.579 -4.568 8.065 -1.322*** 
ROA After 3910 1.606 3.542 -4.017 12.156 218 0.099 1.415 -4.017 4.672 -1.506*** 
Prof. Lending Before 3652 6.400 1.551 0.000 33.100 252 5.168 4.411 0.000 62.600 -1.234*** 
Prof. Lending After 3569 6.420 1.569 0.000 34.880 212 4.570 2.362 0.000 21.300 -1.849*** 
SRISK Before 1441 0.463 1.444 0.000 11.170 202 1.329 2.445 0.000 13.340 0.866*** 
SRISK After 1504 0.473 1.490 0.000 13.340 183 1.274 2.164 0.000 11.540 0.801*** 
SIFI Before 6115 0.011 0.109 0.000 1.000 306 0.072 0.259 0.000 1.000 0.061*** 
SIFI After 5687     0.012 0.109 0.000 1.000 277 0.072 0.259 0.000 1.000 0.062*** 
 
Panel B: Crisis versus non-crisis period 
 Non-crisis Crisis Diff. 
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max  
∆ (TA) Before 123 0.250 0.623 -3.384 1.813 115 0.411 0.521 -0.135 2.168 0.161** 
∆ (TA) After 99 0.251 0.575 -3.484 1.601 110 0.353 0.585 -0.302 1.927 0.101 
Diff.  0.025     -0.075*     
∆ (Lev) Before 124 0.005 0.077 -0.502 0.635 115 0.003 0.016 -0.027 0.118 -0.002 
∆ (Lev) After 99 -0.002 0.029 -0.146 0.183 110 0.002 0.015 -0.027 0.061 0.004 
Diff.  -0.019*     -0.001     
Loans Before 144 0.577 0.179 0.034 0.849 116 0.597 0.186 0.034 0.850 0.021 
Loans After 106 0.576 0.164 0.055 0.850 111 0.580 0.189 0.033 0.850 0.003 
Diff.  -0.018*     -0.009     
Loan Reserves Before 137 5.124 3.630 0.264 19.353 107 2.839 2.314 0.260 15.094 -2.285*** 
Loan Reserves After 98 5.247 5.700 0.469 42.248 107 4.394 5.548 0.219 43.750 -0.853 
Diff.  1.116**     1.805**     
Write-offs Before 140 0.015 0.015 0.000 0.117 115 0.011 0.013 0.004 0.089 -0.004** 
Write-offs After 103 0.016 0.031 0.012 0.213 111 0.017 0.023 0.000 0.185 0.001 
Diff.  0.005     0.007**     
ROA Before 147 0.011 1.826 -4.567 8.065 116 0.452 1.157 -4.566 4.288 0.441** 
ROA After 107 0.198 1.510 -4.017 4.672 111 0.005 1.317 -4.017 2.073 -0.192 
Diff.  -0.195     -0.455*     
Prof. Lending Before 137 4.672 5.476 0.000 62.600 115 5.759 2.536 1.350 17.810 1.087** 
Prof. Lending After 102 4.585 2.311 0.000 21.000 110 4.557 2.420 1.350 16.700 -0.027 
Diff.  0.131     -1.144*     
SRISK Before 119 1.261 2.094 0.000 9.930 83 1.423 2.883 0.000 13.340 0.166 
SRISK After 102 1.214 2.239 0.000 11.540 81 1.350 2.076 0.000 7.900 0.137 
Diff.  0.017     -0.034     
SIFI Before 187 0.118 0.323 0 1 - - - - - - 
SIFI After 158 0.095 0.294 0 1 119 0.042 0.201 0 1 -0.053* 

















Panel C: SEO versus control banks 
 SEO=0 SEO=1 Diff. 
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max  
Size 3951 15.140  2.440 10.990 19.890 263 17.580 2.260 10.990 19.890 -2.440*** 
Equity 4015 0.220 0.270 0.030 0.920 264 0.073 0.080 0.030 0.920 0.150*** 
Liquidity 3962 0.214 0.182 0.016 0.705 263 0.175 0.123 0.016 0.710 0.038*** 
NIM 3918 2.337 1.754 -0.666 6.189 261 2.157 1.186 -0.666 6.189 0.181** 
CTI 3764 61.236  23.871 9.091 111.010 259 63.567 16.380 27.393 111.016 -2.330** 
PB Ratio 2653 1.405  1.509 0.103 19.890 234 1.243 1.529 0.132 19.890 0.161 
Price Vol. 1950 24.680 10.919 2.500 82.210 232 29.014 8.938 7.070 59.530 -4.340*** 
Year listed 3562 12.350  7.668 0.003 35.961 260 16.441 8.509 0.455 35.961 4.090*** 
GDP Growth 5670 1.314  2.915 -17.950 12.230 294 0.856 2.835 -8.270 12.233 0.457*** 
Reg. Quality 5646 1.325 0.419 -0.072 1.924 294 1.228 0.386 0.498 1.911 0.096*** 
 
Panel D: crisis versus non-crisis period 
  Non-crisis Crisis Diff. 
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min. Max  
            
Size 2578 15.155 2.509 10.996 19.892 1636 15.509 2.462 10.996 19.892 -0.353*** 
Equity 2616 0.219 0.272 0.026 0.917 1663 0.203 0.264 0.026 0.917 0.015* 
Liquidity 2577 0.218 0.186 0.016 0.705 1648 0.201 0.168 0.016 0.705 0.018** 
NIM 2550 2.312 1.758 -0.665 6.189 1629 2.346 1.671 -0.666 6.189 -0.034 
CTI 2463 62.161 24.162 9.091 111.016 1560 60.162 22.279 9.091 111.016 1.998*** 
PB Ratio 1674 1.242 1.426 0.103 19.890 1213 1.599 1.599 0.104 19.890 -0.356*** 
Price Vol. 1500 24.755 11.153 2.890 82.210 682 25.977 9.960 2.500 72.180 -1.220*** 
Year listed 2646 12.629 7.798 0.003 35.961 1176 12.629 7.798 0.003 36.961 - 
GDP Growth 3976 1.549 2.187 -8.863 10.601 1988 0.775 3.937 -17.950 12.230 0.774*** 















Table 4: Fixed-effect regression 
In this table, Panels A-C show estimation results for different regression specifications: Panel A shows country fixed-effect estimations, Panel B the specialization on lending fixed-effect estimations, 
and Panel C shows year fixed-effect estimations. For the SIFI status we report conditional logits with country, specialization on lending, and year fixed effects respectively. Robust standard errors are in 
the parenthesis after the parameter estimates. The ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The Number of observations, R-squared, F-test, and the within group 
variation for the fixed-effect estimations (rho) are reported for all specifications at the end of each panel.  
Panel A: Country Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 ∆ (TA) ∆ (Lev) Loans Loan reserves Write-offs ROA Prof. lending SRISK SIFI (logit FE) 
SEO 0.136*** 0.0005 -0.021** 1.261*** 0.0025 -0.117 -0.277** 0.417*** 0.395 
 (0.031) (0.001) (0.011) (0.364) (0.003) (0.106) (0.125) (0.130) (0.542) 
Size 0.059*** -0.002 -0.022*** -0.585*** -0.0015** 0.144*** -0.009 0.385*** 5.813*** 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.103) (0.0007) (0.026) (0.031) (0.052) (1.674) 
Equity -0.445** 0.068*** -0.704*** 7.024* -0.023 1.988*** -0.659 -4.985** 40.850 
 (0.216) (0.013) (0.101) (3.693) (0.029) (0.739) (0.873) (2.425) (25.09) 
Liquidity 0.679*** -0.001 -0.821*** 0.064 0.0229** 0.474 -1.951*** 3.502*** 5.166 
 (0.089) (0.005) (0.030) (1.180) (0.009) (0.305) (0.359) (0.467) (3.546) 
NIM 0.047*** -0.007 0.016*** -0.062 -0.0004 0.299*** 0.57*** -0.167** 0.298 
 (0.013) (0.007) (0.004) (0.164) (0.0013) (0.044) (0.052) (0.083) (0.773) 
CTI 0.001 0.007* -0.002** 0.035*** -0.00017** -0.012*** -0.002 -0.009** -0.0099 
 (0.0007) (0.004) (0.0002) (0.009) (0.00007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.0298) 
PB Ratio -0.003 -0.006 0.003 -0.208 -0.0035*** 0.185*** 0.223*** -0.079 -.0609 
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.004) (0.148) (0.001) (0.042) (0.049) (0.076) (0.778) 
Price Vol. -0.001 -0.002*** -0.001* .168*** 0.0004*** -0.032*** -0.007 0.029*** 0.163** 
 (0.001) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.017) (0.0001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.068) 
Year listed 0.002*** -0.001 -0.001*** -0.0001*** -0.00007 0.0006*** 0.0008*** 0.00008*** .00005 
 (0.0004) (0.002) (0.0003) (0.00005) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00002) (0.0001) 
GDP Growth 0.009** 0.002 0.004*** -0.242*** 0.027*** 0.005 0.081*** 0.019 -0.741*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.045) (0.01) (0.013) (0.015) (0.018) (0.169) 
Reg. Quality -0.093 -0.007 -0.063* -3.957*** 0.0002 -0.802** -0.715* 0.018 4.181 
 (0.106) (0.006) (0.036) (1.300) (0.0003) (0.365) (0. 431) (0.464) (3.074) 
Crisis -0.101*** 0.003*** 0.037*** -0.626** 0.006*** -0.471*** 0.411*** 0.002 -4.487*** 
 (0.020) (0.001) (0.007) (0.245) (0.002) (0.069) (0.082) (0.097) (1.016) 
Constant -1.025*** -0.006 1.368*** 14.126*** 0.0079 -0.698 5.371*** -6.849*** - 
 (0.222) (0.013) (0.076) (2.866) (0.022) (0.758) (0.896) (1.244) - 
N 1116 1116 1114 980 1087 1116 1117 673 603 
R-squared 0.194 0.046 0.546 0.304 0.045 0.232 0.436 0.379 266.42*** 
F-test 24.90*** 4.54*** 109.91*** 26.67*** 4.10*** 28.18*** 35.46*** 34.15***  

















Panel B: Specialization on lending Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 ∆ (TA) ∆ (Lev) Loans Loan reserves Write-offs ROA Prof. lending Systemic risk SIFI (logit FE) 
SEO 0.173*** 0.001 -0.029*** 1.158*** 0.0389** -0.149 -0.319** 0.429*** 1.55** 
 (0.032) (0.002) (0.010) (0.346) (0.016) (0.106) (0.136) (0.135) (0.620) 
Size 0.049*** -0.002 -0.023*** -0.298*** 0.0278*** 0.119*** -0.024 0.395*** 2.645*** 
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.002) (0.093) (0.004) (0.026) (0.034) (0.049) (0.593) 
Equity 0.225 0.095*** -0.728*** 0.954 3.095*** 4.391*** -1.642 -1.317 -5.51 
 (0.259) (0.014) (0.095) (3.617) (0.136) (0.865) (1.114) (2.246) (24.693) 
Liquidity 0.828*** 0.001 -0.761*** -3.207*** -0.092* 1.036*** -0.677* 4.827*** 15.570*** 
 (0.095) (0.005) (0.029) (1.123) (0.05) (0.318) (0.409) (0.461) (4.13) 
NIM 0.006 -0.001** 0.005 0.491*** -0.023*** 0.227*** 0.83*** -0.076 0.904 
 (0.011) (0.0006) (0.003) (0.130) (0.0058) (0.038) (0.0486) (0.064) (0.556) 
CTI 0.001 0.009*** -0.002*** .033*** 0.0228*** -0.010*** 0.0027 0.002 0.024 
 (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.009) (0.007) (0.003) (0.0009) (0.004) (0.027) 
PB Ratio -0.005 -0.003 0.005 -0.263* 0.0024*** 0.222*** 0.212*** -0.260*** 1.14** 
 (0.013) (0.007) (0.004) (0.144) (0.0006) (0.043) (0.055) (0.076) (0.735) 
Price Vol. -0.003** -0.001* -0.001** 0.148*** 0.107*** -0.035*** 0.004 0.008 -0.09** 
 (0.001) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.014) (0.015) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.045) 
Year listed 0.001** -0.001 -0.001 -0.00006 -0.001 0.00002 -0.0001*** 0.00005 0.0003*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.024) (0.00005) (0.001) (0.000016) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.0001) 
GDP Growth 0.0.004 0.006 0.002** -0.229*** 0.003*** 0.037*** 0.079*** 0.039** -0.214 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.041) (0.0004) (0.012) (0.0157) (0.018) (0.161) 
Reg. Quality 0.085*** -0.004 -0.056*** -1.487*** -0.0001*** -0.075 -0.457*** -0.017 5.219*** 
 (0.031) (0.001) (0.009) (0.344) (0.00002) (0.103) (0.132) (0.170) (1.480) 
Crisis -0.119*** 0.002** 0.032*** -0.836*** -0.0005 -0.456*** 0.344*** 0.021 -2.183* 
 (0.021) (0.001) (0.006) (0.240) (0.011) (0.069) (0.089) (0.103) (1.187) 
Constant -0.951*** -0.003 1.392*** 6.065*** -0.983*** -1.307** 4.087*** -7.485*** - 
 (0.188) (0.010) (0.059) (2.287) (0.096) (0.628) (0.809) (1.120) - 
N 1116 1116 1114 980 1087 1116 1117 673 603 
R-squared 0.248 0.048 0.547 0.341 0.289 0.278 0.458 0.417 254.04*** 
F-test 25.03*** 5.90*** 100.64*** 37.34*** 8.55*** 35.22*** 68.37*** 35.56***  

















Panel C: Year Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 ∆ (TA) ∆ (Lev) Loans Loan reserves Write-offs ROA Prof. lending Systemic risk SIFI (logit FE) 
SEO 0.194*** 0.002 -0.018* 1.392*** 0.0228 -0.209** -0.159 0.475*** 1.734** 
 (0.032) (0.002) (0.010) (0.356) (0.017) (0.101) (0.126) (0.139) (0.595) 
Size 0.070*** -0.002 -0.017*** -0.454*** 0.023*** 0.136*** 0.033 0.454*** 2.733*** 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.088) (0.0038) (0.023) (0.028) (0.047) (0.518) 
Equity 0.135 0.068*** -0.397*** -1.854 2.992*** 3.354*** -2.452*** 0.141 -9.016 
 (0.224) (0.011) (0.09) (3.593) (0.137) (0.713) (0.885) (2.279) (17.845) 
Liquidity 0.677*** -0.005 -0.872*** -0.108 -0.0769 0.429 -1.348*** 4.242*** 9.801*** 
 (0.093) (0.005) (0.03) (1.129) (0.051) (0.293) (0.365) (0.457) (2.639) 
NIM 0.026** -0.009 0.008** 0.441*** -0.027*** 0.233*** 0.924*** -0.057 1.061** 
 (0.011) (0.005) (0.004) (0.134) (0.006) (0.035) (0.044) (0.066) (0.455) 
CTI 0.002*** 0.007* -0.002*** 0.031*** 0.0027*** -0.013*** 0.0007 .0059659 0.0023 
 (0.0007) (0.004) (0.0002) (0.009) (0.0004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.02) 
PB Ratio -0.013 -0.001* -0.003 -0.153 0.028*** 0.192*** 0.026 -0.311*** 1.032 
 (0.013) (0.0006) (0.004) (0.150) (0.0073) (0.042) (0.051) (0.083) (0.659) 
Price Vol. -0.001 -0.004 -0.001** 0.169*** 0.0029*** -0.036*** 0.021*** 0.007 -0.074** 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.0004) (0.014) (0.0006) (0.004) (0.0049) (0.005) (0.039) 
Year listed 0.006 0.004 -0.002 -0.0001*** -0.00001*** 0.00003** -0.0001*** 0.00003* 0.003*** 
 (0.0004) (0.002) (0.039) (0.00005) (0.000005) (0.00001) (0.0002) (0.00002) (0.001) 
GDP Growth 0.004 0.004 0.0005 -0.415*** 0.0866*** 0.092*** 0.039** 0.071*** -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.059) (0.0149) (0. 017) (0.021) (0.026) (0.121) 
Reg. Quality 0.156*** -0.008 -0.054*** -1.258*** -0.0037 -0.195** -0.309*** 0.259 6.17*** 
 (0.028) (0.001) (0.009) (0.332) (0.0028) (0.089) (0.111) (0.161) (1.27) 
Constant -1.546*** 0.001 1.314*** 7.884*** -0.865*** -1.438** 2.98*** -8.981*** - 
 (0.175) (0.009) (0.059) (2.213) (0.0937) (0.554) (0.689) (1.075) - 
N 1116 1116 1114 980 1087 1116 1117 673 603 
R-squared 0.236 0.037 0.542 0.333 0.291 0.248 0.423 0.422 307.02*** 
F-test 34.50*** 5.42*** 128.11*** 40.31*** 47.03*** 31.66*** 95.43*** 44.05***  
















Table 5: Propensity score matching (PSM) 
The table gives the results from the propensity score matching estimation. Panel A shows the probit regression estimates of banks’ 
propensity to undertake a SEO. The dependent variable equals one for banks that have undertaken a SEO and zero otherwise. All 
explanatory variables are lagged one year. The standard errors in the estimated coefficients are clustered at the bank level and 
reported in parenthesis. The *, **, and *** stand for statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. In Panel B 
the average treatment on the treated (ATT) comes from the kernel matching estimator and is computed one, two, and three years after 
the SEO respectively. ATT is based on bootstrapped standard errors and is in the parentheses.  
 
 
Panel A: Probit regression Panel B: Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) 
Variables Coeff. Outcome variable 1 year 2 years 3 years 
Size 0.198*** ∆ (TA) 0.208*** 0.216*** 0.267*** 
  (0.031)  (0.062)  (0.040)  (0.059) 
Equity -6.530*** Treated versus Control 186 versus 1096 186 versus 1096 186 versus 1096 
  (1.903) ∆ (Lev) 0.000 0.001 -0.000 
Liquidity -0.496  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  
  (0.407) Treated versus Control 186 versus 1096 186 versus 1096 186 versus 1096 
NIM 0.086 Loans -0.018** 0.029** 0.019* 
  (0.057)   (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) 
CTI 0.007** Treated versus Control 186 versus 1096 186 versus 1096 186 versus 1096 
  (0.003) Loan reserves 0.949* 0.590 0.630 
PB Ratio -0.017   (0.696) (0.692) (0.423) 
  (0.062) Treated versus Control 186 versus 1096 186 versus 1096 186 versus 1096 
Price Vol. 0.009** Write-offs 0.009*** 0.004** 0.003* 
  (0.005)   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Year listed -0.00003* Treated versus Control 186 versus 1096 186 versus 1096 186 versus 1096 
  (0.00001) ROA  -0.130* -1.385*** -1.366*** 
GDP Growth -0.010   (0.085) (0.162) (0.146) 
  (0.016) Treated versus Control 186 versus 1096 186 versus 1096 186 versus 1096 
Reg. Quality -0.016 Prof. Lending -0.481*** -0.435** -0.480***  
  (0.125)   (0.134) (0.210) (0.089)  
Crisis 0.131 Treated versus Control 186 versus 1096 186 versus 1096 
186 versus 
1096  
  (0.095) SRISK 0.835*** 0.765*** 0.622***  
Constant -4.657***   (0.273) (0.180) (0.255)  
  (0.784) Treated versus Control 186 versus 1096 186 versus 1096 
186 versus 
1096  
  SIFI 0.085*** 0.120*** 0.168*** 
   (0.029) (0.050) (0.040) 
  Treated versus Control 161 versus 1095 161 versus 1095 161 versus 1095 
  ∆CoVaR 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.024*** 
N 1450  (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 














Table 6: Reasons for SEOs (PSM) 
The table gives the average treatment on the treated (ATT) from the propensity score matching estimation applied to different subsamples: low capitalized banks (with a total common equity ratio lower 
than 3.5%) versus well-capitalized  (Panel A); banks with a low share of nonperforming loans with respect to gross loans is lower than the 25th percentile are defined as Low NPLs versus banks with a 
share of NPL greater than the 75th percentile that are defined as High NPLs (Panel B); banks with a low price-to-book ratio that is lower than the 20th percentile versus banks with a ratio greater than 
the 80th percentile that are defined  as High PB ratio (Panel C); banks which have received a state recapitalization or state guarantees (Panel D); and banks with low versus high asset growth rates (Panel 
E). For all subsamples, the probit regression of banks’ propensity to undertake a SEO is estimated but not reported. The dependent variable equals one for banks that have undertaken a SEO and zero 
otherwise. All explanatory variables are lagged one year. The standard errors in the estimated coefficients are clustered at the bank level and are in the parenthesis. The *, **, and *** stand for statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The average treatment on the treated (ATT) comes from the kernel matching estimator and is computed one year after the SEO. The ATT is 
based on bootstrapped standard errors and they are in the parentheses. When the effects are estimated on Equity (outcome variable) we remove it from the vector of regressors. 
 Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D Panel E 
Outcome variables Low Capitalized Well-Capitalized Low NPLs High NPLs Low PB ratio High PB ratio 
State 
recapitalization 
Low asset growth High asset growth 
∆ (TA) 0.355*** 0.033* -0.036 0.182* 0.328*** 0.018 0.546*** 0.020** 0.132*** 
 (0.066) (0.027) (0.133) (0.143) (0.108) (0.063) (0.195) (0.015) (0.081) 
∆ (Lev) 0.000 0.000 -0.004 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.011 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.072) (0.003) (0.001) 
Loans -0.024 -0.016** 0.018*** -0.015 0.023* -0.029 0.053 -0.028** 0.025*** 
 (0.021) (0.011) (0.006) (0.027) (0.011) (0.112) (0.048) (0.024) (0.015) 
Loan reserves 0.380 1.622** 0.037 3.015** 0.881* 2.985** 0.907* 2.907** 0.412** 
 (0.459) (0.707) (0.373) (1.673) (0.371) (0.847) (0.695) (1.710) (0.254) 
Write-offs -0.001 0.008*** -0.001 0.029** 0.006* -0.006** 0.011* 0.012*** 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.002) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) 
ROA 0.071 -0.294*** 0.452** -0.687* -0.372** -0.125 0.117** -0.391** -0.019 
 (0.131) (0.111) (0.245) (0.552) (0.205) (0.274) (0.044) (0.309) (0.118) 
Prof. Lending -0.202 -0.678*** -0.221 -0.654*** -0.561*** -0.150 0.787*** -0.469*** -0.325** 
 (0.259) (0.194) (0.538) (0.185) (0.242) (0.933) (0.322) (0.212) (0.205) 
SRISK 1.071** 0.098* -0.683** 0.733* 1.605*** -0.546** -0.630* -0.007 0.612** 
 (0.386) (0.085) (0.417) (0.493) (0.313) (0.166) (0.542) (0.057) (0.376) 
SIFI -0.031 0.118*** 0.061 0.101* 0.039 0.001 -0.062* 0.015 -0.029 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.051) (0.061) (0.068) (0.023) (0.041) (0.023) (0.039) 
Equity 0.006*** -0.014***        
 (0.002) (0.002)        
          
Treated versus 
control 
88 versus 252 98 versus 876 28 versus 149 31 versus 154 43 versus 176 20 versus 164 20 versus 14 46 versus 312 85 versus 396 
N 347 1103 211 224 373 190 40 446 508 
















Table 7: Instrumental variable results 
In this table, Panels A-J show the estimation results for the IV regression analysis: column (1) gives the first-stage regression results, whereas 
columns (2), (3), and (4) give the second-stage results one, two, and three years after the SEOs. Each panel shows the effects of SEOs on each 
dependent variable: Asset Growth (Panel A), Deleveraging (Panel B), Loans (Panel C), Loan loss reserves (Panel D), Write-offs (Panel E), ROA 
(Panel F), Profitability of lending (Panel G), SRISK (Panel H), ∆CoVaR (Panel J). Panel I (SIFI status) shows the probit instrumental variable 
regression estimated via MLE. The robust standard errors are in the parenthesis after the parameter estimates. The *, **, and *** stand for statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively . The Number of observations, R-squared, Wald test, and Sargan test are given for all 
specifications at the end of each panel.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Panel A: Asset Growth   Panel B: Deleveraging 
Variables  First stage After 1 year After 2 years After 3 years First stage After 1 year After 2 years After 3 years 
SEO   0.487** 0.464** 0.777***  -0.019** 0.021** -0.007 
 
  (0.215) (0.235) (0.232)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Inst. Investor  -0.044**    -0.057**    
 
 (0.018)    (0.015)    
Value Traded  0.243***    0.236*    
 
 (0.064)    (0.059)    
Constant  -1.2*** -1.286*** -1.753*** -1.544*** -0.977 0.008 0.014 -0.022 
 
 (0.418) (0.073) (0.127) (0.037) (0.35) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  684 684 571 471 684 684 571 471 
R-squared  0.048 0.191 0.199 0.047 0.1314 0.1771 0.1720 0.0713 
F-test (Wald)  122.13*** 194.21*** 161.95*** 122.13*** 7.801*** 39.62*** 32.68*** 48.26*** 
Sargan test  0.766 - - - 0.426 - - - 
  Panel C: Loans Panel D: Loan reserves 
Variables  First stage After 1 year After 2 years After 3 years First stage After 1 year After 2 years After 3 years 
SEO   -0.065*** 0.264*** 0.214***  4.867*** 4.756*** 8.423*** 
   (0.02) (0.013) (0.016)  (0.538) (0.894) (2.201) 
Inst. Investor  -0.062**    -0.064**    
  (0.024)    (0.025)    
Value Traded  0.213*    0.231***    
  (0.075)    (0.075)    
Constant  -0.778 1.332*** 1.947*** 1.022** -0.786 8.497*** 11.855*** 12.701*** 
  (0.498) (0.023) (0.044) (0.321) (0.531) (1.234) (2.534) (3.58) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  705 705 586 479 637 637 525 432 
R-squared  0.135 0.577 0.049 0.123 0.134 0.284 0.228 0.068 
F-test (Wald)  8.34*** 982.67*** 746.27*** 685.46*** 7.43*** 312.10*** 179.19*** 96.70*** 
Sargan test   0.669  - - -  0.653  - - - 
  Panel E: Write-offs Panel F: ROA 
 Variables  First stage After 1 year After 2 years After 3 years First stage After 1 year After 2 years After 3 years 
SEO   0.031*** 0.001 0.028*** First stage After 1 year After 2 years After 3 years 
   (0.006) (0.005) (0.008)  -0.736*** -0.549*** -0.595*** 
Inst. Investor  -0.061**    -0.063** (0.014) (0.06) (0.206) 
  (0.025)    (0.024)    
Value Traded  0.224***    0.214***    
  (0.078)    (0.075)    
Constant  -0.726 0.054*** 0.043* 0.009 -0.845* -2.500*** -1.900*** -1.002*** 
  (0.514) (0.02) (0.022) (0.011) (0.482) (0.052) (0.029) (0.033) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  687 687 567 464 707 707 587 479 
R-squared  0.141 0.166 0.076 0.192 0.135 0.285 0.174 0.156 
F-test (Wald)  8.55*** 80.58*** 50.26*** 43.72*** 8.34*** 309.26*** 159.49*** 109.10*** 
Sargan test  0.001 - - - 0.602 - - - 
  Panel G: Profitability of lending Panel H: SRISK 
 Variables  First stage After 1 year After 2 years After 3 years First stage After 1 year After 2 years After 3 years 
SEO   -3.558*** -0.956*** -1.235***  0.844** 0.711 0.895*** 
   (0.173) (0.084) (0.448)  (0.347) (0.484) (0.361) 
Inst. Investor  -0.062**    -0.071**    
  (0.024)    (0.035)    
Value Traded  0.215***    0.242**    
  (0.075)    (0.105)    
Constant  -0.836* 2.221*** 1.109*** 0.543*** -1.624 -9.215*** -9.322*** -9.538*** 
  (0.479) (0.356) (0.222) (0.111) (0.983) (0.647) (0.625) (0.731) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  708 708 587 479 446 446 384 327 
R-squared  0.135 0.246 0.485 0.540 0.142 0.464 0.489 0.499 
F-test (Wald)  8.35*** 480.67*** 529.34*** 600.02*** 5.46*** 369.26*** 355.11*** 317.14*** 
Sargan test  0.045 - - -  0.579 - - - 
  Panel I: SIFI Panel J: ∆CoVaR 
 Variables  First stage After 1 year After 2 years After 3 years First stage After 1 year After 2 years After 3 years 
SEO   0.164*** 0.217*** 0.410**  0.013 0.045** 0.095*** 
   (0.029) (0.126) (0.185)  (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) 
Inst. Investor  -0.060***    -0.056***    
  (0.022)    (0.015)    
Value Traded  0.208***    0.195***    
  (0.064)    (0.058)    
Constant  -0.925** -0.751*** -0.871*** -0.968*** -0.951*** -0.224*** -0.241*** -0.257*** 
  (0.455) (0.062) (0.153) (0.013) (0.326) (0.027) (0.029) (0.037) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  850 850 742 637 760 760 670 577 
R-squared  0.131 0.208 0.119 0.111 0.1341 0.3546 0.2963 0.0994 
F-test (Wald)  9.74*** 259.10*** 197.76*** 200.19*** 8.24*** 417.83*** 339.62*** 241.18*** 
Sargan test  0.679 - - - 0.324 - - - 
 
